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MARC – Mergers & Acquisitions Research Centre 
MARC is the Mergers and Acquisitions Research Centre at Cass Business School, City, 
University of London – the first research centre at a major business school to pursue 
focussed leading-edge research into the global mergers and acquisitions industry. 
MARC blends the expertise of M&A accountants, bankers, lawyers, consultants and 
other key market participants with the academic excellence of Cass to provide fresh 
insights into the world of deal-making. 
Corporations, regulators, professional services firms, exchanges and universities use 
MARC for swift access to research and practical ideas. From deal origination to closing, 
from financing to integration, from the hottest emerging markets to the board rooms of 
the biggest corporations, MARC researches the wide spectrum of mergers, acquisitions 
and corporate restructurings. 
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Overview
t is too early to tell how Coca-Cola’s bid to 
buy Costa Coffee from Whitbread will play 
out commercially but analysts calculate that 
Coca-Cola’s offer of £3.9b represents a 
remarkable premium of around 70 per cent on 
the coffee chain’s estimated value. Whitbread’s 
share price jumped 19 per cent on news of the 
deal. However, the longer-term value of this 
strategic deal for the world’s biggest beverage 
giant – its biggest in eight years – are yet to play 
out. 
This paper is an attempt to investigate if certain 
financial advisors (FAs) – notably, top-tier 
investment banks and/or accounting firms – are 
better equipped in delivering long-term value to 
UK acquisitions. It is a key question for 
analysts, investors, shareholders, governments 
and company executives. Produced by the 
M&A Research Centre (MARC) at Cass 
Business School, our report seeks to add new 
insights into the UK M&A market – both before 
and since the financial crash of 2007/8 – by 
better understanding the UK market for 
financial advisors who help close acquisition 
deals in one of the biggest economies in the 
world. 
A crowded and competitive pitch… 
More and more firms have entered the UK 
advisory services market which has been 
influenced by policy responses to global 
financial events including Enron in 2001 and the 
financial crisis of 2008. It can be loosely 
segmented into the following players: top-tier 
investment banks; universal banks; boutique 
M&A investment banks and, increasingly, 
accounting firms. Thompson Reuters, 
Bloomberg and others publish to advisor league 
tables encouraging advisors duke it out to rank 
as high as possible in the hope of winning a 
competitive advantage in client pitches. 
                                                          
1 Golubov, A., Petmezas, D. and Travlos, N., The Journal 
of Finance, 2012 and Bilinski, P. and Yim, A., SSRN, 
2016. 
…so how to value and choose the best 
financial advice for your deal? 
Most academic analyses of the M&A market 
have found that bidders experience negative or 
insignificant abnormal returns in both the short-
term window (up to ten days before and after an 
acquisition) and over the longer-term, up to 
three years after an acquisition, causing critics 
to question the core purpose of the M&A in 
driving ‘value creation’.  However, such 
concerns have far from stopped the M&A 
juggernaut:  In the first half of 2018 alone, 
worldwide deal-making totalled $2.5 trillion, up 
64 per cent compared to the same period in 
2017 and surpassing the previous $2.3 trillion 
historic high for the comparable period of 2007. 
Is anyone playing the long game? 
Past studies have questioned whether certain 
financial advisors are better positioned to 
ensure better returns to the bidder. Many have 
failed to show a relationship between the 
financial advisor and bidder returns. The two 
papers that did identify more significant 
linkages1 both didn’t research if this reaction is 
a short-term effect only signalling investors’ 
confidence, or if these advisors are really better 
at finding deals with more synergies. If so, the 
bidder should be able to demonstrate better 
results in the long-term – as well as the short-
term – after the deal is implemented. 
Picking a financial advisor to unlock 
longer-term value 
Are top-tier investment banks and/or 
accounting firms really better than other 
advisors in finding M&A targets that have a 
long-lasting positive effect on the bidder or do 
both outlier papers reveal only a short-lived sign 
of confidence by investors? This MARC paper 
to finds an answer to this question.
I 
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Background (and what we knew)
revious academic literature studied the 
effect financial advisors have on the 
CAR share return of the bidder around 
the announcement date. Our study considers 
the long-term effect accounting firms and top-
tier investment banks have on M&A deals when 
acting as the financial advisor of the acquiror or 
bidder. 
This paper sought to test if investors’ perception 
is correct and holds for the long-term after 
implementing the deal by looking at the three-
year buy-and-hold accumulate returns (BHAR) 
to research acquirors’ actual post-merger 
performance. 
M&A advisory plays a large part in the world of 
investment banking and competition is fierce. In 
2016, over 46 per cent of Goldman Sachs’ 
investment banking division’s total revenue 
came from M&A advisory services and it also 
contributed the biggest share of revenue in 
Credit Suisse’s and JP Morgan’s investment 
bank divisions. 
Ranking banking 
League tables ranking advisors based on fees 
earned or total deal value are published by firms 
like Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg. Banks 
are keen to perform well as a firm’s higher 
ranking will positively affect future M&A activity, 
especially with inexperienced M&A clients. 2 
High rankings confer prestige and gives banks 
a competitive edge when pitching. The 
importance of those league tables has gone so 
far that banks allegedly manipulate their M&A 
reports to achieve a better league position, 
sparking a FCA clampdown in 2016. 3 
                                                          
2 Derrien, F. and Dessaint, O., SSRN, 2016 
3 Binham, C., Ft.com, 2018 
4 Hunter, W. and Jagtiani, J., Review of Financial 
Economics, 2003, Raghavendra Rau, P., Journal of 
What league tables tell us (and what 
they don’t) 
Other academics have in the past struggled to 
make sense of league tables and their findings 
imply rankings that can be misleading at times 
and do not always tell the whole story4. Despite 
leading to further work for the investment bank, 
as noted above, few links between acquiror 
gains and a bank’s ranking in league tables 
have been found, supporting what researchers 
call the “deal completion hypothesis”, i.e. that 
banks are more concerned about deal 
completion than value gained for the acquiror. 
Do banks strike better deals for 
bidders? 
One study in 20125 studied the bidder-advisor 
matching and concluded that top-tier 
investment banks are able to strike better deals 
for a bidder by being better at identifying 
strategic synergies and driving a hard bargain 
on price – what they describe as ‘better merger’ 
and ‘skilled negotiation’ advantages. 
Both that study and another in 20116, conclude 
that top-tier investment banks add more value 
to acquisitions compared to non-top-tier 
advisors in the short-term around the 
announcement day. As with accounting firms, 
this paper tested these results to establish if 
they also held in the long-term. If banks are 
better at identifying synergies and negotiating, 
we might reasonably expect acquirors they 
advise to outperform the market in the long-run. 
  
Financial Economics, 2000 and Ismail, A., Review of 
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2009. 
5 Golubov, A., Petmezas, D. and Travlos, N., ibid. 
6 Bao, J. and Edmans, A., Review of Financial Studies, 
2011. 
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Our approach
uy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) 
were used to build a model testing the 
above hypotheses whether top-tier 
investment banks and accounting firms add 
value in the three-year window after an 
acquisition. We took a sample 774 M&As from 
within the UK market between the beginning of 
January 2000 and end of December 2014 (our 
list of deals ends in 2014 in order to be able to 
test performance three years after the deal 
completion).  Key variables were added to our 
model to ensure results were apportioned and 
captured correctly. Key hypotheses we tested 
are summarized here: 
What impact did the financial crisis 
have on deal value post-2008 
Tighter financial and bank regulations followed 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the 2008 
financial crisis it sparked, including the Dodd-
Frank act in the U.S. and Basel III for banks. 
Low or even negative interest rates have 
become the norm, bank regulations have 
tightened enormously and, crucially for M&A, 
investors have become more risk averse.  
Generally, banks have become more limited 
and restricted in their dealings and much more 
prudent. Our paper therefore distinguishes 
between the performance of advisors before 
and after the 2007/8 financial crisis. 
Testing bias in deal and accounting 
characteristics  
Researchers have found certain deal and 
accounting characteristics to influence the 
bidder’s stock-return upon announcement of an 
acquisition. To properly research the long-term 
performance of acquirors and the financial 
advisor-effect, some of those variables need to 
be included so to apportion the returns correctly 
these fall into two categories discussed here: 
characteristics unique to each deal and 
performance / accounting characteristics of the 
bidder. 
Deal characteristics 
Our paper tested for key deal characteristics 
where market bias had been identified by 
previous research including: payment methods, 
public versus private targets, family ownership, 
cross-border acquisitions and disclosure 
quality. For example, previous studies have 
shown the following: 
− Cash financed bids send a more 
favourable signal to investors than share 
payments. Negative returns are reported 
post-announcement when offer includes a 
“stock-offer”. 
− Acquisitions of a public target create 
negative returns for the bidder, whereas 
acquisitions of a private or subsidiary 
target will give significant positive returns. 
− Acquisitions of targets with significant 
family ownership will have a negative 
effect on post-M&A returns. 
− Cross-border acquisitions return lower or 
negative returns in comparison to 
domestic ones for a variety of reasons, 
including different tax and accounting 
regimes. 
− Targets from countries with lower 
disclosure regulations will perform worse 
in the long-term as firms are likely to 
overpay for the available synergies. 
Accounting characteristics 
Based on leading research in this area, our 
paper adopts the following hypotheses relating 
to accounting characteristics: 
− Higher leverage of the bidder will positively 
impact post-acquisition returns. 
− The bidder’s ‘Tobin’s q’ or ‘market-to-book’ 
ratio and post-acquisition performance are 
inversely correlated. 
− Pre-acquisition profitability positively 
influences post-acquisition performance. 
− Liquidity of the bidder negatively affects 
post-acquisition performance. 
− A relatively bigger deal (higher ratio to the 
bidder’s market value) is expected to have 
a negative effect on post-takeover 
performance of the acquiror.  
B 
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Our findings 
here were eight key findings related to 
these deals and their advisors. 
Deals advised by top-tier 
investment banks produce better 
short- and long-term value 
Our findings are consistent with previous 
studies noted earlier that top-tier investment 
banks bring a positive improvement in the 
cumulative abnormal returns in the short-term 
window after an M&A announcement, but only 
when the target is public. However, our paper 
suggests that the buy-and-hold returns over 36 
months would be much higher than previously 
found, a positive gain to the acquiror / newly-
merged firm by over 19 per cent – a significantly 
stronger link than previous research has 
identified. It implies that the initial positive 
market reaction of an M&A advised by top-tier 
investment banks is justified as, over the long-
term, these deals really do produce better 
value.  
…because proper deal implementation 
trumps deal price? 
We offer two explanations of these results: 
First, top-tier investment banks charge 
significantly higher fees than other advisors 
such as accounting firms, hence an aura of 
prestige and reputation around them exists. 
Paying the right price for the target is the first 
step for ensuring long-term profitability of an 
acquisition, but proper implementation of the 
deal is what ultimately counts. Given the high 
fees bidders pay to top-tier banks, they are 
more likely to adhere to the suggested 
structures of deal implementation. When paying 
less to advisors or hiring less prestigious 
advisors, bidders might be less likely to adhere 
to the suggested advice, hence a worse long-
term performance. Secondly, most top-tier 
investment banks have a long legacy in the 
M&A advisory market, comparatively to 
accounting firms and other boutique advisors. 
They therefore might have a better knowledge 
in ensuring the deal is also properly 
implemented. This might explain why deals 
advised by top-tier investment firms see better 
long-term performance than deals advised by 
accounting firms or other investment banks. 
Initial positive investor reaction to 
accounting firms advising M&A does 
not last 
It is often claimed that accounting firms should 
be better placed to value the possible synergies 
and the target more fairly ensuring no 
overpayment of the premium. Whilst previous 
research found that investors react more 
positively at the announcement date when 
accounting firms are named as the advisor, our 
analysis shows that the effect does not seem to 
last. 
The financial crisis strongly impacted 
long-term deal performance in the EU 
post-2008 
Supporting previous research, this paper’s 
findings would imply that acquisitions after the 
crisis on average also destroyed value in 
comparison to pre-crisis deals. Our findings 
imply that the phenomenon is not only 
statistically significant but also very strong. As 
76 per cent of deals in our sample were within 
Europe, the strong effect the crisis had on 
Europe might explain why deals post-2008 
show as performing worse. 
Public acquisitions are more 
challenging in both the short and long 
term 
Our findings uphold the general hypothesis that 
acquisitions of a public target create negative 
returns for the bidder in the short term 
compared to acquisitions of a private or 
subsidiary target which give more positive 
returns. Moreover, we find that such negative 
returns are also sustained over the longer term.
T 
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Poor disclosure and cross-border 
targets challenge long-term deal 
performance  
Our results confirm that the quality of disclosure 
at the target’s jurisdiction has an impact on the 
long-term performance post-acquisition. 
Nevertheless, this seems to only make a 
difference when acquiring a private firm. The 
logical explanation for this might be that 
publicly-listed companies have more 
compliance requirements and private 
companies have more accounting choices. 
Discrepancies between the acquiror’s and 
target’s reporting can make it harder for firms to 
merge successfully. Our results on cross-
border deals with targets outside the UK, finds 
the majority of deals perform worse. This 
reinforces both findings as a majority of 
countries have a lower disclosure index than 
the UK. Studies have also found that cross-
border deals have additional challenges with 
post-closing integration. 
Market-to-book value may positively 
influence long-term returns for 
subsidiary targets deals 
Market-to-book, or Tobin’s q, coefficient is very 
low at 1.35% but highly significant. This result 
only holds for subsidiary deals. It would prove 
that a target’s market-to-book value positively 
influences long-term returns. It would imply that 
‘glamour’ firms (higher q-ratio) perform better 
than ‘value’ firms (lower q-ratio). This is 
contrary to the findings of previous studies7 and 
may result from our small sub-sample. 
Past profitability is a guide to future 
profitability for public targets 
Our results strongly support previous research 
that post-acquisition RoE (return on equity) is 
dependent on pre-acquisition RoE. It is no 
surprise then that the buy-and-hold returns of 
the company are also dependent on it. 
Nevertheless, this is only found to be significant 
if the target was a public firm. 
                                                          
7 See, for example, Raghavendra Rau, P. and Vermaelen, 
T., Journal of Financial Economics, 1998. 
Other variables  
All other variables in our model are found to be 
insignificant. This is a common sight in studies 
that not all variables will receive statistically 
significant results.  To ensure the robustness of 
these novel findings, various robustness tests 
were carried out with no discernable adverse 
findings.
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Conclusions  
&A is finally back, but what 
price advice?  
The worldwide M&A market has seen the 
strongest year-to-date growth in the first half of 
2018 since records began. Our paper shows 
that bidders looking to capitalize on today’s 
cheap money and unprecedented resurgence 
in M&A activity should think carefully about their 
choice of financial advisor to maximise long-
term shareholder value. 
Which advisors are playing the long 
game in M&A value creation? 
Our research builds on previous research into 
short-term returns. We found bidders who hire 
top-tier investment banks as their advisor, 
especially for bigger deals, stand a better 
chance of seeing their new acquisition give 
higher returns (even in the long-run) than M&A 
deals advised by non-top-tier advisory firms.  In 
conclusion: 
1. Top-tier investment banks justify their high 
fees by unlocking better long-term value: 
Our paper supports past research arguing 
that investment banks are able to strike 
better deals for a bidder by being better at 
identifying strategic synergies and driving 
a hard bargain on price.  Top-tier banks 
may also be better placed to ensure the 
deal is also properly implemented. Our 
research shows deals advised by top-tier 
investment banks show better short- and 
long-term performance than any other 
advisor category, justifying the high fees 
charged and the importance of publishing 
advisory league tables. 
 
2. Accounting firms have yet to demonstrate 
their full value: Many bidders turn to 
financial advisors to help them in valuing 
their target, but we found no evidence that 
accounting firms were better equipped to 
do this. Despite early positive investor 
perceptions, we found no evidence to 
show that accounting firms bring additional 
value to the long-term deal performance. 
Despite accounting firms being more 
strongly represented when the deal or 
target is smaller or private, this new breed 
of M&A adviser has yet to demonstrate 
their full value to grow their current market 
share.  Contrary to our initial belief, we 
could not observe any gain in market share 
in the six years after the 
2008 crisis for accounting firms. 
 
Despite identified limitations in our research 
(see Appendix), the findings of this papers are 
a significant stepping stone in understanding 
M&A deal performance. We show that the right 
choice of financial advisor can turn mergers and 
acquisitions into a long-lasting success for the 
acquiror and investors alike either by inspiring 
investor confidence or by striking better deals. 
Paying high fees to top-tier investment banks 
might indeed be a worthy investment for the 
future as returns will be higher. 
Time will tell if the fizz surrounding Coca-Cola’s 
acquisition of Costa will go flat over the next 
three years. Alison Brittain, chief executive of 
seller Whitbread said: “They are giving us a lot 
of the value that they are going to create [in 
Costa’s future growth] in the price they are 
willing to pay.”  
However, bid advisor Akeel Sachak of 
Rothschild (a bank ranked just outside the top-
tier of our 2000-14 research), hints of the 
strategic synergies and long-term value still to 
be tapped: “The strategic importance goes 
beyond what its scale might imply… I suspect 
this deal will wrongfoot those who still see 
Coca-Cola as the business it was five or 10 
years ago, when it was seen as being about 
selling as much Coca-Cola as possible.” 
If our research is correct and Rothschild are 
competing for the top-tier, this is good news for 
long-term shareholders. 
  
M 
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Appendix
Data and methodology 
Data of mergers and acquisitions are taken from the SDC Platinum platform. The time period for the 
sample is between 01.01.2000 and 31.12.2014 and only includes M&As’ where a majority interest was 
gained. As the proposed analysis for long-term performance requires stock performance data and 
completed deals only this paper requires bidder firms to be: 
− based in the UK; 
− bidder is publicly traded; and 
− deals that were announced and completed prior to 31.12.2014. 
This leaves us with an initial sample of 3,163 mergers. Since financial firms have a lot of insider 
knowledge in the M&A industry, this paper follows Allen, Jagitani, Peristiani, and Saunders (2002) and 
excludes all deals that involve financial firms as either target or acquiror. Available SIC codes (6000-
6999) are used to exclude the above-mentioned. 
Further, the sample is restricted to include only deals where information on the financial advisor exists 
and where only a single firm acted as sole advisor. The sample size is further reduced manually to 
exclude deals where accounting firms and investment banks are listed together as one advisor. The 
latter restriction is due to the fact that if more than one advisor exists, it hampers the ability to properly 
evaluate the influence each advisor itself had on the merger. Three more deals are removed as their 
advisor name is given as ‘no investment bank retained’. This leaves the final sample to include a total 
of 774 mergers. 
Descriptive statistics of the sample 
The final sample size contains 11 accounting firms, eight top-tier investment banks, and 140 non-top-
tier banks were noted acting as financial advisors for the bidder who advised on 112, 130 and 532 deals 
respectively. 
Our methodology 
This section will discuss the methodology used to gain answers for our hypotheses. 
Rather than using the CAR method, our paper choses to study the influence of advisors on an M&A 
looking at the long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) after 3 years (36 months) advocated 
by Barber and Lyon (1997). The post-event period starts from the date the deal was announced. This 
should allow to capture actual long-term performance of acquirors after their M&A rather than just 
investors’ expectations of an M&A and the “announcement effect”. The BHAR is calculated from the 
difference in the long-term return for a sample firm i and the return of a buy-and-hold investment 
asset/portfolio such as the UK MSCI-All index. 
How we measured advisors 
To ensure financial advisors are grouped and captured correctly, top-tier investment bank advisors 
need to be defined. Following previous studies, the top-8 investment banks by value of deals advised 
are classified as top-tier. All other advisors are considered as non-top tier. The advisor league-table for 
the UK during the sample-period is downloaded from Thompson Reuters with ranking as follows: 
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Table 1 – Top 20 financial advisors in the UK between 2000-2014 
This table was created using Thomson Financial SDC Platinum. It ranks the top-20 M&A advisors 
according to value of deals they advised on for all deals in the UK between 01.01.2000 and 31.12.2014. 
Credit was allocated fully to both bidder and target firm advisor and to every eligible advisor in the case 
of multiple advisors. 
 
Rank   Name Deal Value ($Mil) # of deals 
 Top-tier   
1  Goldman Sachs & Co 1,053,312.40 489 
2  Morgan Stanley 951,014.80 402 
3  JP Morgan 925,011.30 553 
4  Citi 889,781.20 455 
5  UBS 876,210.80 526 
6  Bank of America Merrill Lynch 743,867.50 373 
7  Credit Suisse 720,449.50 390 
8  Deutsche Bank 715,312.70 417 
 Non-top tier (shown from top-9
th to top 20th)  
9  Rothschild & Co 657,382.20 924 
10  Lazard 513,635.80 404 
11  Nomura 407,803.20 193 
12  Barclays 333,510.50 142 
13  RBS 280,439.60 233 
14  HSBC Holdings PLC 240,162.30 270 
15  Commerzbank AG 198,084.50 244 
16  BNP Paribas SA 180,943.10 124 
17  Greenhill & Co, LLC 139,061.40 102 
18   PricewaterhouseCoopers 135,405.90 1020 
19  Cazenove & Co 119,751.10 119 
20  RBC Capital Markets 107,078.00 89 
 
M&A between advisory firms or name changes are tracked to ensure all advisors are captured correctly. 
Recommendations for future research: 
Limitations we identified in our research included: 
− The definition of which investment bank qualifies to be in the top-tier bracket is consistent with 
previous studies but remains arbitrary; the findings of this paper have showed to be sensitive to 
this definition. 
 
− The BHAR model is criticised for it having its biases8, especially through cross-correlation. More 
could be done to enhance our findings by adopting remedies like bootstrapping9 or a correction 
procedure to adjust for cross-sectional bias.10 
 
− Future research could introduce additional controls to account for bias in a bidder’s choice of 
advisor, which is not completely random.  
                                                          
8 Brav, A. Journal of Finance, 2000; Mitchell, M. and Stafford, E., The Journal of Business, 2000 
9 Ikenberry, D., Lakonishok, J., and Vermaelen, T., Journal of Financial Economics, 1995 
10 Dutta, S. and Jog, V., Journal of Banking and Finance, 2009; Mitchell, M. and Stafford, E., ibid. 
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